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MARTHA CARROLL, Widow of Andrew J. Carroll; 
and 
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
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On Petition for Review of a Decision 
and Order of the Benefits Review Board 
(BRB No. 93-0887 BLAO; 
OWCP No. 191-03-2274) 
               
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 21, 1995 
 
BEFORE:  GREENBERG, COWEN, and SAROKIN, Circuit Judges 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
               
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
   This matter is before us on a petition for review of a 
decision and order of the Benefits Review Board of the United 
States Department of Labor dated October 26, 1994, affirming an 
award of benefits on a miner's and survivor's claim filed 
pursuant to the provisions of the Black Lung Benefits Act, as 
amended, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (the "Act"). 
 This case originated when the miner, Andrew J. Carroll, 
filed a claim for benefits on June 7, 1978.  The Department of 
Labor (the "DOL") issued a Notice of Initial Finding on June 25, 
1979, indicating that it had determined preliminarily that 
Carroll had become totally disabled as of June 7, 1978, and 
identifying National Mines Corporation as the operator 
potentially liable for benefits to be paid from June 1, 1978. See 
20 C.F.R. §§ 725.413, 725.412.  The DOL required National Mines 
3 
to file a controversion to the determination within 30 days or be 
deemed to have accepted the initial finding of entitlement and to 
have waived its right to contest the claim, absent good cause 
shown.  See 20 C.F.R. § 725.413.  The notice was sent to National 
Mines on June 27, 1979, but not to its insurance carrier, Old 
Republic Insurance Company.  On September 30, 1980, the DOL 
issued an Award of Benefits addressed to Old Republic which, in 
light of National Mines' failure to respond to the June 25, 1979 
order, was essentially a default judgment.  However, neither 
National Mines nor Old Republic initiated payment and thus the 
Black Lung Disability Trust Fund made the payments on their 
behalf from June 1978 to February 1981.0 
 On March 25, 1981, counsel entered an appearance on     
behalf of National Mines and Old Republic who together are the 
petitioners.  By letter dated July 10, 1981, petitioners' counsel 
informed DOL that Old Republic intended to controvert Carroll's 
claim.  Old Republic stated that it elected to have Carroll 
examined by a physician on September 3, 1981, and requested that 
the record stay open on the ground that this was the earliest 
available appointment.  On September 25, 1981, and June 16, 1983, 
Old Republic submitted the results of its medical testing.  The 
matter then languished. 
                     
0The fund paid Carroll $12,908.84.  It ceased payments to Carroll 
after he was awarded Pennsylvania workers' compensation benefits 
as the result of his pneumoconiosis.  See 30 U.S.C. §932(g); 20 
C.F.R. § 725.533(a)(1).  Moreover, because Carroll's widow was 
awarded state benefits as a result of Carroll's pneumoconiosis, 
the Fund has not paid her interim benefits.  Id.   
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 By letter dated September 24, 1986, a supervisor at Old 
Republic wrote to the DOL claims examiner inquiring into the 
status of Carroll's claim.  The letter referred to an August 12, 
1986 telephone conversation in which "it was determined that the 
initial finding issued by the Department of Labor [in] June, 1979 
was not controverted by either Old Republic Insurance Company or 
[its] attorney."  The supervisor stated that the DOL claims 
examiner had indicated in that conversation that she "would 
review the file and issue an amended notice."  However, the 
supervisor stated that no amended order or notice had been 
received.  The supervisor sent similar letters of inquiry on July 
6, 1987, and June 1, 1989.0 
 On August 14, 1989, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.310 
and 725.480, the DOL entered an order directing Carroll to show 
cause within 30 days why Old Republic should not be given the 
opportunity to controvert the claim.0  The order stated as a 
finding of fact that "[a]n initial finding of entitlement to 
benefits was made on June 25, 1979; the responsible operator's 
insurance company was not notified of that finding and, 
                     
0On June 3, 1989, Carroll died.  Martha E. Carroll, his widow, 
filed a survivor's claim on February 16, 1990, and her claim 
proceeded independently.  The DOL initially denied the claim but 
notified National Mines of its potential liability for survivor's 
benefits.  National Mines controverted the claim and submitted 
additional evidence.  After her claim was denied again, the widow 
requested a hearing before an administrative law judge and her 
claim was consolidated with Carroll's claim for a hearing.  Her 
claim, however, may be moot because she was awarded derivative 
survivor's benefits under her husband's claim.  See 30 U.S.C. 
§932(1). 
0
 There is no explanation in the record for the approximate 
three-year time span between the 1986 correspondence and the 1989 
Order to Show Cause. 
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therefore, did not have the opportunity to controvert the claim." 
Because Carroll did not respond, the DOL gave Old Republic 30 
days to controvert the claim.  On October 3, 1989, Old Republic 
filed an "Operator Controversion Form" on behalf of itself and 
National Mines.  In its supplemental response, petitioners 
argued, inter alia, that the DOL was precluded by the statute of 
limitations set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 725.603(c)(6) from 
collecting benefit reimbursements from both National Mines and 
Old Republic because the DOL had failed to bring an enforcement 
action within six years of the date upon which there had been a 
final determination of liability, September 30, 1980.   
 By letter dated November 16, 1989, the DOL informed 
petitioners that because it had accepted the controversion, the 
DOL intended to rescind the Decision and Order of September 30, 
1980, which had been based upon National Mines' failure to 
controvert the initial findings.  Old Republic objected to the 
rescission.  In response, the DOL stated that it would not 
rescind the Decision and Order of September 30, 1980, and that 
the issue would be addressed at an informal conference.   
 After an informal conference, a DOL deputy commissioner 
recommended that the September 30, 1980 decision and order be 
rescinded.  The deputy commissioner also stated that "[t]he 
Controversions filed by [petitioners] on October 3, 1989 and 
October 17, 1989 are herewith accepted as timely."  The case was 
referred subsequently to the Office of the Administrative Law 
Judges for consideration of several contested issues, including 
the questions of whether the September 30, 1980 Decision and 
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Order should be considered final and whether the six-year statute 
of limitations set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 725.603(c)(6) precludes 
imposition of liability on National Mines and/or Old Republic for 
any benefits awarded in this case. 
 On October 22, 1991, a formal hearing was held.  On 
December 14, 1992, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") issued a 
Decision and Order - Awarding Benefits.  The ALJ determined, as a 
preliminary matter, that the rescission of the September 30, 1980 
order was proper and equitable.  The ALJ concluded that the claim 
had been reopened on petitioners' own initiative.  In support of 
his conclusion that National Mines and Old Republic "were aware 
of [Carroll's] claim and [had] attempted to file a controversion 
well before the expiration of the six-year statute of 
limitations," the ALJ cited the petitioners' counsel's appearance 
on March 25, 1981, and the subsequent letter, dated July 10, 
1981, which stated that petitioners were controverting the claim 
and electing to have Carroll examined by a physician.0  The ALJ 
concluded that a final determination regarding Carroll's 
eligibility had not been reached yet, thereby precluding the 
applicability of the six-year statute of limitations.   
 The ALJ also determined that the medical evidence 
showed that Carroll was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis 
and that, as a result, his widow was entitled to benefits on his 
behalf as well as survivor's benefits under 20 C.F.R. § 725.212. 
                     
0
 The ALJ also referred to a letter dated April 2, 1981, in which 
Petitioners "stated it had received a copy of the September 30, 
1980 letter from the carrier, and had requested a complete file 
for review."  We do not find this document in the appendix. 
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The ALJ determined that Carroll was entitled to benefits 
commencing June 1, 1978, and that the widow was entitled to 
derivative benefits commencing on June 1, 1989.  Consequently, 
National Mines was ordered to pay benefits under the Act to 
Carroll with derivative benefits to his widow and to reimburse 
the Trust for payments previously made.   
 National Mines and Old Republic appealed the Decision 
and Order to the Benefits Review Board, specifically challenging 
the ALJ's findings regarding the applicability of the statute of 
limitations set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 725.603(c)(6) and the 
commencement of benefits date.  On October 26, 1994, the Board 
issued a Decision and Order affirming the ALJ's award of 
benefits.  On December 23, 1994, National Mines and Old Republic 
filed a petition for review to this court challenging the Board's 
affirmance of the ALJ's decision to rescind the September 30, 
1980 Award of Benefits.0 
 We have jurisdiction over the petition for review 
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(c), as incorporated by the Act, 30 
U.S.C. § 932(a).  We review decisions of the Board "for errors of 
law and to assure that it has adhered to its own standard of 
review."  BethEnergy Mines, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 39 F.3d 458, 
462-63 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Director, OWCP v. Barnes & Tucker 
Co., 969 F.2d 1524, 1526-27 (3d Cir. 1992)).  "[T]he Board must 
accept an ALJ's findings of fact if they are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole."  Id. 
                     
0
 Mrs. Carroll is not participating in the appeal. 
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at 463.  We exercise plenary review over the Board's legal 
determinations.  Id. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 Petitioners do not challenge the award of benefits on 
the merits.  Rather, they argue that the DOL was without 
authority to rescind its September 30, 1980 Award of Benefits and 
thereby reopen the claim.  Petitioners allege that the DOL, after 
nine years of inactivity, realized in 1989 that no action had 
been taken within the six-year statute of limitations period set 
forth in 20 C.F.R. § 725.603(c)(6) to enforce the lien against 
them.  Petitioners assert that the DOL, to reinstate its 
enforcement rights, reopened the case without authority to 
restart the running of the six-year statute of limitations and 
legitimize a future enforcement action.  
 In the first place, petitioners' reliance on section 
725.603(c)(6) is misplaced.  Under that section, a lien for the 
amount paid out by the Fund due to an employer's failure to pay 
benefits arises in favor of the United States against the 
employer's property when liability for those benefits finally is 
determined.  30 U.S.C. § 934(b)(2); 20 C.F.R. § 725.603(b). 
Section 725.603(c)(6) provides that the Secretary of Labor may 
enforce the lien in a district court where "the proceeding is 
commenced within 6 years after the date upon which liability is 
finally determined."   
 However, the statute of limitations cited refers only 
to the enforcement proceedings described in section 725.603, 
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which must brought in the district court.  Thus, the statute of 
limitations on which petitioners rely is not applicable in the 
administrative proceedings we review, as those proceedings were 
aimed not at enforcing a lien but at determining liability.  In 
short, because the petition before us has been filed to review an 
administrative determination and not to review a judgment in a 
district court enforcement action, the question of whether 
section 725.603(c)(6) acts to bar the enforcement of liens 
against petitioners is not before us.  Because petitioners have 
not directed our attention to any applicable statute of 
limitations, there is no basis for us to vacate the Board's 
decision on statute of limitations grounds. 
 Nonetheless, implicit in petitioner's brief is an 
argument that the DOL lacked authority to reopen Carroll's claim 
after 30 days from the September 30, 1980 Award of Benefits. 
Petitioners argue that the September 30, 1980 Award of Benefits 
became final because neither National Mines nor Old Republic 
filed a timely controversion challenging the award within the 30-
day period allowed by 20 C.F.R. § 725.419(a).  Section 725.419(d) 
provides that:  
If no response to a proposed decision and 
order is sent to the deputy commissioner 
within the period described in paragraph (a) 
of this section...the proposed decision and 
order shall become a final decision and 
order, which is effective upon the expiration 
of the applicable 30-day period.  Once a 
proposed decision and order...becomes final 
and effective, all rights to further 
proceedings with respect to the claim shall 
be considered waived, except as provided in 
§725.310. 
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Petitioners assert that Old Republic's letter of controversion 
filed in July 1981 and its submission of medical evidence in 
September 1981 and June 1983 had no effect on the finality of the 
September 30, 1980 Award of Benefits because their failure to 
file a controversion within the 30-day period set forth in 20 
C.F.R. § 725.419(a) deprived them of standing to submit any 
further challenge.  In support of this interpretation of events, 
they note that the DOL did not accept explicitly as timely filed 
either the letter of controversion or any of the medical evidence 
submitted in 1981 and 1983. 
 However, section 725.419(d) clearly contradicts 
petitioners' contention that the failure to file a timely 
controversion left them without an avenue for further review of 
the award.  Significantly, section 725.419(d) provides that "all 
rights to further proceedings shall be considered waived, except 
as provided in § 725.310."  (Emphasis added.)  Section 725.310 
provides that: 
Upon his or her own initiative, or upon the 
request of any party upon the grounds of a 
change in conditions or because of a mistake 
in a determination of a fact, the deputy 
commissioner may, at any time before one year 
from the date of the last payment of 
benefits...reconsider the terms of an award 
of denial of benefits. 
 
Upon timely request, the deputy commissioner may "issue a new 
compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, 
increase, or decrease such compensation, or award compensation." 
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33 U.S.C. § 922.0  The deputy commissioner may make such 
modification to "render justice under the act."  O'Keeffe v. 
Aerojet Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254, 255, 92 S.Ct. 405, 407 
(1971).0 
 The DOL submits that Old Republic's letter of 
controversion filed in July 1981 and its later submission of 
medical evidence were sufficient to constitute a timely request 
for modification.  The DOL's assertion that the informal 
procedures employed in black lung and longshore cases never have 
required the submission of a formal request for modification is 
supported by case law.  See, e.g., Eifler v. OWCP, 926 F.2d 663, 
667 (7th Cir. 1991).  Moreover, the July 1981 letter was timely 
because it was filed within one year of the last payment of 
                     
0
 Section 725.310 implements section 22 of the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 922, as 
incorporated by 30 U.S.C. § 932(a). 
0Petitioners argue that the filing of a timely controversion is a 
prerequisite to a request for modification.  They submit that 
"[t]o conclude otherwise would mean that employers could 
challenge an award of benefits at any time by this or like means 
without the need for ever filing formal controversion papers." 
Br. at 16.  However, this interpretation is at odds with the 
plain language of section 725.419(d).  Section (d) clearly sets 
out 20 C.F.R. § 725.310 as an exception to the waiver occasioned 
by a failure to file a timely controversion. 
 
 Moreover, our holding does not provide an incentive for 
employers to ignore the 30 day requirement of 20 C.F.R. 
§725.419(a), because the exercise of section 725.310 authority 
is, to some extent, discretionary.  There really is no 
qualitative difference between these provisions and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which ordinarily require defendants to 
file an answer to the complaint within 20 days, see Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(a)(1)(A), yet allow default judgment debtors to move for 
relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
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benefits to Carroll by the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund in 
February 1981.   
 The DOL reasonably could infer from petitioners' 
submission of medical evidence that they sought modification on 
the ground of a factual mistake regarding the existence or extent 
of Carroll's disability.  See Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers 
Ass'n, 390 U.S. 459, 464-65, 88 S.Ct. 1140, 1144 (1967); 
O'Keeffe, 404 U.S. at 254-56, 92 S.Ct. at 406-07 (holding that 
the authority to re-open is not limited to any particular type of 
facts; the Board may review the very existence of a liability as 
well as its extent).  See also Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. 
Rambo, 115 S.Ct. 2144, 2147 (1995).   
 Moreover, petitioners' letters of inquiry dated 
September 24, 1986, July 6, 1987, and June 1, 1989, which assert 
that Old Republic did not receive service of the Notice of 
Initial Finding, provided an additional ground for modification 
if viewed in conjunction with their earlier letter of 
controversion.  Two courts of appeal have held that under the 
Black Lung Act and regulations the operator's insurance carrier 
is subject to liability in black lung benefits proceedings and, 
therefore, is entitled to notice as a party to the litigation. 
Tazco, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 895 F.2d 949, 950 (4th Cir. 
1990)0; Warner Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 804 F.2d 346, 347 (6th 
Cir. 1989).  The Warner Coal court noted that the Act and 
                     
0
 The Tazco court explicitly rejected the theory that notice 
provided to the coal mine operator constitutionally may be 
"imputed" to the carrier.  Tazco, 895 F.2d at 951. 
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regulations do not contemplate limiting the carrier's exposure to 
indemnifying an operator found liable for payments of benefits.0   
Warner Coal, 804 F.2d at 347.  Instead, because the carrier is 
subject to liability on the claim, due process requires that it 
be given adequate notice and an opportunity to defend on the 
question of its direct liability to the claimant. Id.  See also 
Tazco, 895 F.2d at 953 (holding that failure to notify the 
carrier required vacation of default award and requiring DOL to 
provide insurance carrier and the operator with an opportunity to 
contest the merits of the claim). Consequently, the DOL's 
rescission in this case of its September 30, 1980 Award and offer 
of a new hearing are in accord with the Tazco court's approach.  
That being the case, the DOL generally is entitled to use the 
modification procedures set out in 33 U.S.C. § 922 to remedy a 
failure to notify the appropriate insurance carrier.  See 
Claudill Constr. Co. v. Abner, 878 F.2d 179, 181 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 Petitioners attempt to avoid these principles by 
alleging that the statement in the various letters of inquiry 
that Old Republic had not received the Notice of the Initial 
Finding is erroneous.  Petitioners reason that their action to 
controvert the determination of liability in 1981 shows that Old 
                     
0
 As the Tazco court explained, "[o]nce a carrier has reported 
the issuance of a policy, as mandated by the regulations, the 
insurer is fully liable for the obligations of the operator.... 
The carrier is required to discharge the statutory and regulatory 
duties imposed on the employer, thus stepping into his 
shoes....Moreover, unlike an indemnification policy, the Black 
Lung Benefits scheme contemplates that the insurer, as a party, 
may be liable in the original claims proceeding."  Tazco, 895 
F.2d at 951-52 (citations omitted).            
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Republic had notice of Carroll's claim approximately five years 
before the first letter of inquiry was written.  Petitioners fail 
to acknowledge that the significance of DOL's failure to provide 
Old Republic with service is that Old Republic thereby was 
deprived of the opportunity to file a timely challenge to the 
DOL's initial findings and receive a hearing at which it could 
contest them.  Old Republic's subsequent awareness of the 
liability determination does not remedy the DOL's failure to 
serve it because Old Republic was left without an opportunity to 
contest the initial liability determination.  Consequently, 
because the allegation that Old Republic had not been served 
properly raises the possibility of a violation of its due process 
rights, the DOL reasonably could treat Old Republic's submissions 
as a request for time to file a timely controversion. 
 In sum, we conclude that 33 U.S.C. § 922 authorizes the 
DOL to reopen an otherwise final award to "render justice under 
the act."  O'Keeffe, 404 U.S. at 255, 92 S.Ct. at 407.  Of 
course, there was an inexplicable lengthy delay in these 
proceedings between the time of petitioners' request for 
modification and the DOL's action, and petitioners spend much 
time in their brief arguing that the delay was improper and 
therefore the subsequent modification procedures failed to toll 
the statute of limitations.  But the reasons for that delay are 
not before us.0  We rule only that the statute of limitations 
                     
0The DOL certainly can be faulted for failing to respond to 
petitioners' inquiries in a timely manner.  The DOL offers no 
explanation for its failure to take any action on this claim 
between its September 30, 1980 Award of Benefits and its    
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relied on by petitioners is inapplicable to these proceedings, 
that the DOL had the authority to construe petitioners' letters 
as requests for modification proceedings, and that the reasons 
stated in those letters provided legitimate substantive bases for 
rescinding an otherwise final award.  Nonetheless, as the DOL 
points out in its brief, "as a general rule, the mere existence 
of modification proceedings does not affect the finality of an 
existing award of compensation."  Br. at 24.  Thus, it 
acknowledges that "the Department cannot initiate modification 
simply to obtain a new date for the commencement of the six-year 
statute of limitations."  Id.  Whether the modification procedure 
tolled the statute of limitations will be a question before a 
district court in an enforcement proceeding, if one is brought, 
and we do not rule on it. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition 
for review. 
                                                                  
August 14, 1989 Order to Show Cause, despite petitioner's 
controversion letter. 
